Resumen En el presente trabajo se investigan los alcances y las consecuencias que se desprenden de utilizar a Heidegger en el campo de la filosofía de la medicina. Con este fin, la investigación se divide en los siguientes puntos: 1) se explicitará en qué puede consistir una “antropologización” del pensamiento heideggeriano; 2) se ofrecerá una descripción general respecto de las teorías de la salud y enfermedad más significativas y actuales en el campo de la teoría de la medicina; 3) nos (...) detendremos en el análisis relacionado con el problema de la enfermedad desde una perspectiva heideggeriana, para finalmente, 4) ofrecer algunas reflexiones críticas en relación con el análisis ofrecido.In this contribution we investigate the scope and consequences that arise from applying Heidegger in the field of philosophy of medicine. For this purpose, the paper is divided in the following points: First, we will make explicit the meaning of an “anthropologization” of Heidegger's thought. Second, an overview of the most significant contemporary theories of health and disease in the field of theory of medicine will be offered. Third, we will interpret the meaning of disease from a Heideggerian perspective. Finally, 4) we will offer some critical reflections offered in relation to the analysis. (shrink)

The 'Metaphysics of Dasein ' is the name which Heidegger gave to a new philosophical project developed immediately after the partial publication of his masterwork Being and Time. As Heidegger was later to recall, an 'overturning' took place at that moment, more precisely right in the middle of the 1929 treatise On the Essence of Ground. Between the fundamental-ontological formulation of the question of being and its metaphysical rephrasing, Heidegger discovered that a 'metaphysical freedom' stood at the root of Dasein (...) 's relation to his world and, thus, at the basis of his whole ontological questioning. This article will show how the very structure of the 1929 essay clearly illustrates the path Heidegger followed between Being and Time and the new philosophical beginning of the mid 1930s. It will conclude with a few critical remarks concerning Heidegger 's attempt to free his thinking from traditional philosophy and to overcome metaphysics. (shrink)

The relationship between present-day philosophy and philosophy of the past is a fundamental issue for understanding today’s philosophical division between “analytical” and “continental” philosophy. However, the opposition doesn’t lie in the mere rejection or acceptation of philosophy’s history. In fact, both philosophical traditions conceive the possibility of a dialog with the great philosophers of the past. This paper first characterizes the relationships with past philosophy in both traditions and arguments in favor of the relevancy of philosophy’s history for philosophy.

Phenomenology was born as an attack against the false constructions of traditional philosophy. Nevertheless, it soon discovered that it had an important bond to Plato’s, Descartes’ or Kant’s philosophical systems. As I show in this paper, both in Heidegger and in Husserl’s last writings, the philosophical endeavor is interpreted as a retrieval of earlier philosophical intentions. However, this does not lead them to a common interpretation of the meaning of philosophy’s history.

When Heidegger takes the decision at the end of the 1920’s to « risk again the step into an authentic metaphysics », a very strong solidarity is already established between his philosophical project and that of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. This solidarity is testified in the recuperation Heidegger does of the idea – proper to Kant and Baumgarten – of a metaphysica naturalis. The « Metaphysics of Dasein » constitutes the last attempt – after the hermeneutics of facticity and (...) the fundamental ontology – to define philosophy starting from « human nature ». After this « step into metaphysics », Heidegger’s thought will dedicate its efforts to the well-known « Overtaking of metaphysics ». (shrink)

L’histoire et l’historicité constituent deux éléments d’une importance inestimable dans la construction de la phénoménologie heideggérienne. Le caractère historique de l’existence humaine, d’une part, représente incontestablement le point d’achoppement central de sa reprise de la méthode husserlienne et définit la teneur de cette phénoménologie aux accents herméneutiques. D’un autre côté, l’histoire pensée comme région ontologique et comme thème d’une science possible – cette question si se...

La publication d'Etre et temps en 1927 a fait de Martin Heidegger une figure d'importance dans le panorama philosophique allemand des annees 1920. Au cours des annees suivantes, il voyage pour donner des conferences qui attirent tant les philosophes que les curieux captives par la reputation du penseur de la Foret Noire. Or, plutot que de se contenter de presenter le projet de 1927, ces conferences ont deja l'ambition de le depasser. Ce livre examine le contenu de quatre conferences inedites (...) (L'anthropologie philosophique et la metaphysique du Dasein, Hegel et le probleme de la metaphysique, La consideration sur le temps de Saint Augustin, Philosopher et croire) tout en retracant les evenements importants qui ont marque la vie de Heidegger durant ces annees de transition que furent 1929 et 1930. (shrink)

During the decade of the 1920s, Martin Heidegger tried to show that a series of unsolved problems was to be found in Aristotle. Besides the problem of being, Heidegger also highlighted the traditional misinterpretations of Aristotle’s problem of the world, which had always understood it as an antecedent of a religious question. Heidegger believed it was still possible to ‘retrieve’ this basic metaphysical problem and sought help from Kant’s concept of a ‘transcendental ideal’ to show that Aristotle’s concept of the (...) divine was the basis of a reflection on the world and not of a theological science. Interpreting Aristotle’s Metaphysics from this Kantian perspective, Heidegger brought new insights into the history of metaphysics and revealed an untapped field of questions for contemporary metaphysics. (shrink)

La lección de metafísica que imparte Heidegger durante el invierno de 1929/30 caracteriza el pensamiento metafísico como un pensamiento comprensivo, es decir, un pensamiento que “entiende” y que “incluye”. En este contexto, Heidegger busca definir con mayor precisión el vínculo que une su propia metafísica con la tradición moderna criticada unos años antes por “incluir”, precisamente, al sujeto humano en su propia elaboración. Es la ocasión para Heidegger de presentar un retrato mucho más matizado de su vinculación con la filosofía (...) moderna, retrato que pone de manifiesto lo que el Dasein ha heredado del sujeto moderno. (shrink)

Heidegger’s critique addressed to philosophical anthropology often leads readers to forget the importance of the question of human beings in his writings. The recent publication of the Black Notebooks and some unpublished lectures shed new light on these philosophical problems and help us define more clearly what it would mean to develop the foundation of anthropological knowledge ontologically. This paper argues that while dealing with mythical existence and with the difference between animals and human beings, Heidegger seized the opportunity to (...) speculate on the ontological origins of ethical life. The paper concludes by showing how Sloterdijk’s attempt to “anthropologize” Heidegger fails to follow the demands of fundamental ontology. (shrink)

Este texto consiste en un primer momento en una presentación general de la obra del Profesor Ramón Rodríguez García. Se presenta después el concepto de “interpretación fenomenológica” como problema central de la “hermenéutica fenomenológica” tal y como la entiende el Profesor Ramón Rodríguez García. Para terminar, se comenta una intervención del Profesor en el Congreso de los Diputados y los vínculos de los temas abordados con la hermenéutica fenomenológica.

English summary: Each of the great philosophical movements of the twentieth century had to reflect on their place in the history of philosophy. This is true even of phenomenology, despite its early desire to shed the weight of encumbering tradition. This study examines the complex relationship that brings together with the history of philosophy the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger. French description: Tous les grands mouvements philosophiques du XXe siecle ont ete tenus de mediter les (...) consequences de leur inscription dans l'histoire de la philosophie. La phenomenologie n'a pas escamote cette tyche, elle qui, nee d'une volonte de se defaire d'une tradition trop encombrante, a fini par chercher... s'expliquer avec elle. Chez Heidegger tout d'abord, chez Husserl ensuite, l'histoire de la philosophie est devenu l'une des problematiques essentielles de la recherche sur les fondements de la methode phenomenologique. Cette etude interroge la relation complexe qui unit... l'histoire de la philosophie la phenomenologie transcendantale de Husserl et la phenomenologie hermeneutique de Heidegger. Plutot que d'opposer ces deux phenomenologies et chercher... en souligner les differences, l'ouvrage fait plutot le pari de montrer qu'elles finirent toutes deux par reconnaOEtre la necessite pour la philosophie de comprendre sa propre histoire et par accepter de se convertir en une phenomenologie historiste, voire meme en une phenomenologie de l'histoire. Chez le jeune Heidegger et le dernier Husserl, la phenomenologie se sera comprise comme une maniere de philosopher qui, tout en reconnaissant sa propre historicite, n'abandonne pas son ambition de parler des choses elles-memes. Docteur en philosophie de l'Universite de Montreal et boursier de la Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, Francois Jaran est presentement professeur... l'Universite de Valence (Espagne). Il est l'auteur de La metaphysique du Dasein (Zeta Books, 2010), Heidegger inedit 1929-1930. L'inachevable Etre et temps (Vrin, 2012) et The Heidegger Concordance (Continuum, 2013). (shrink)

Here the concept of "space" is discussed from two different streams of thought: the view held by Advaita Vedānta, as expounded by Śaṇkara, and the view that emerges from the ongoing debates in modern philosophy of physics. The emphasis is on addressing the following question: is space created or not? To set the necessary backdrop for a better appreciation of the debate that evolved within the Indian tradition, we first examine how the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya schools of thought unfold the (...) concept of ākāśa in relation to their metaphysics. We then carefully analyze a section of Śaṇkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, wherein the creation of ākāśa is discussed at great length. The second part of this essay attempts to highlight the ongoing struggle among physicists to arrive at an understanding of the nature and origin of space, with reference to the general theory of relativity and quantum field theory. It ends with a critical reflection on parallels and differences that come forth from the study of Advaita Vedānta and modern physics. (shrink)

In what is quite possibly the most famous passage of the De revolutionibus, Copernicus implies that nobody could ever place this supreme flaming torch that is the Sun in another or better place than that from which it can illuminate everything simultaneously, namely the centre of this extremely beautiful temple that is our world. Considering the fact that he leaves an interrogatory twist to this argument of convenience, and since he makes this statement without any justification as it seems entirely (...) evident to him, certain Copernicans choose to illustrate this by means of an analogy: if indeed the Sun must be positioned thus, it is because the most appropriate place for the torch intended to illuminate the room is at its centre, and not in one of its corners. Despite the heliosophy of the Renaissance having been shared by both geocentrists and Copernicans alike, this "torch" argument does not appear to have achieved much success: rarely adopted by the Copernican camp, it was even contested by some of them; as for the geocentrists, it held no appeal for them whatsoever. Did this argument of convenience therefore not benefit from the self-evidence attributed to it by Copernicus, and from, in his wake, it's continued support by a good many commentators? As is often the case when it comes to the history of thought, the pseudo-obviousness of this argument is merely the fruit of a blatant anachronism: presenting heliocentrism as the cosmological system that finally grants the Sun its worthy centrality by placing it in the centre of the room and not in a corner, is to ignore the fact that this star of the day already enjoyed, in geocentrism, a centrality esteemed to be perfectly in keeping with both its dignity and its inherent illuminative function. Having lost their grasp on this worldview that no longer belonged to them, the Copernicans thus put forward an argument which, for the geocentrists, is worthless. Yet they could have argued the objective superiority of their centrality over that accorded to the Sun by geocentrism: while the latter is only numerical, on a purely planetary scale, and frankly fictitious, the former is thoroughly spatial, of cosmic proportions and, at least on first approximation, very real. In order to produce arguments of convenience that could carry their own weight, the protagonists of the new cosmology would have benefited from getting to know the world vision of their adversaries a little better instead of addressing them from their own point of view; similarly, instead of treating as an obvious fact that which is only evident to one of the two parties present, historians of scientific thought would also be well advised to have a better understanding of the world vision of those who history now considers as the losers! (shrink)

Émettons le postulat que nos activités, nos pratiques et nos conduites sont enracinées dans le social, dont elles racontent les événements par les mises en scène de la vie. L’action, individuelle autant que collective, étant le vecteur des caractéristiques historiques, sociologiques, politiques, économiques, philosophiques, culturelles et esthétiques de la société.Le fonctionnement..

First recorded in the 14th century, the analogy of spit-roast meat argues that expecting the Sun to rotate around a strictly immobile Earth would be just as ludicrous as trying to move the fire around the roasting meat. On the contrary, it should be the Earth that spins upon itself in order to glean, from all possible angles, all the benefits of the Sun, just as it is the meat’s responsibility to turn on the spit before the motionless fire for (...) it to be perfectly cooked on all sides. Aimed at demonstrating, in geocentricism, the plausibility of the rotation of the Earth and, in heliocentrism, at supporting the physical reality of this terrestrial rotation, nowadays this analogy barely elicits more than an amused, or even condescending, smile. However, its continued long-term existence and its frequency of use — from the 14th to the 19th century, we found it mentioned by no less than 45 different authors — incited us to finally pay attention to it. We then noticed that beyond its explicitly cosmological scope, it raises, in its own way, the question of the purpose of the natural world: had the latter been conceived based upon humankind, then it is normal, despite what this analogy advocates, that the Sun is at the service of something more important than itself by rotating, to the profit of humankind, around the Earth; conversely, since such an infringement of the rule of common sense, as illustrated by this analogy, can neither be justified nor tolerated, it is up to the Earth to move around the Sun. Tracing the vicissitudes of this analogy, over 6 centuries, is thus not only about reconstructing the largely forgotten history of a presently obsolete analogy, but also about discovering the deeper meaning, henceforth incomprehensible, behind it. In describing how this meaning became progressively lost, one can finally pro­vide an understanding of why, in the present day, we are no longer capable of more than an amused smile when happening upon it! (shrink)

This article examines Appaya Dīkṣita’s intellectual affiliation to Śivādvaita Vedānta in light of his well-known commitment to Advaita Vedānta. Attention will be given to his Śivādvaitanirṇaya, a short work expounding the nature of the Śivādvaita doctrine taught by Śrīkaṇṭha in his Śaiva-leaning commentary on the Brahmasūtra. It will be shown how Appaya strategically interprets Śrīkaṇṭha’s views on the relationship between Śiva, its power of consciousness and the individual self, along the lines of pure non-dualism. In this context, the hermeneutical role (...) of the daharavidyā doctrine will be considered with reference to Appaya’s Śivādvaita magnum opus, the Śivārkamaṇidīpikā. (shrink)